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 1 
SAME STANDARD, DIFFERENT OUTCOMES: A CRITIQUE ON DAUBERT AND 
EXPERT ADMISSIBILITY STANDARDS THROUGH THE LENS OF THE TALCUM 




For decades, scholars, commentators, and courts have debated the wisdom of the 
standards used for evaluating expert witnesses.  With courts around the country grappling with 
the mass tort litigation concerning talcum powder (“talc litigation”), and as a result of using 
different standards to evaluate – and in some cases exclude – the same experts, the cases present 
a unique opportunity to consider the issue.  The standard used for evaluating experts in federal 
courts, and some state courts, has developed through common law overtime and is codified in the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.1  The expert admissibility standard, commonly known as the Daubert 
Standard, has long been critiqued by experts in the field.  However, most of the examinations of 
the Daubert Standard are based on one-off cases.  
The talcum powder mass tort litigation presents a unique view of the shortcomings of the 
Daubert Standard due to its widespread nature and presence in the media.2  The litigation is 
based on the premise that the talc products  – Johnson & Johnson Baby Powder and Shower to 
Shower – cause ovarian cancer.3  There were more than 15,500 cases pending against Johnson & 
 
1 See e.g., Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 
579 (1993); GE v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143 (1997); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). Federal 
Rule of Evidence 702. 
2 See e.g., Peter Loftus, Johnson & Johnson’s Legal Challenges Mount, The Wall Street Journal (Oct. 14, 2019), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/johnson-johnsons-legal-challenges-mount-11571055242; Chad Terhune, Johnson & 
Johnson CEO testified Baby Powder was safe 13 days before FDA bombshell, Reuters (Oct. 22, 2019), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-johnson-johnson-talc-ceo-insight/johnson-johnson-ceo-testified-baby-powder-
was-safe-13-days-before-fda-bombshell-idUSKBN1X12GF; Berkeley Lovelace Jr., Johnson & Johnson earnings 
beat expectations despite legal challenges from opioids and talc, CNBC (Oct. 15, 2019), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/15/johnson-johnson-jnj-earnings-q3-2019.html; Lauren Berg, J&J Hit With $40M 
Verdict In Calif. Talc Cancer Trial, Law360 (Sept. 27, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1201417/j-j-hit-
with-40m-verdict-in-calif-talc-cancer-trial.  
3 Johnson & Johnson, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) at 31 (June 30, 2019). 
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Johnson talc products as of June 2019.4  Due to the expansive nature of the talc litigation, the 
same experts have repeatedly been offered in different courts across the country.5  This means 
the same expert can face multiple challenges to their credibility and methodology in Daubert 
Hearings as well as under other expert standards, such as the Frye Standard, in front of different 
judges in different jurisdictions. To trigger a Daubert Hearing, the opposing party moves to 
exclude an expert’s testimony based on one of the five Daubert Factors.  The pitfalls of the 
expert standard become evident when one court allows an expert to give opinions and findings 
while a different court excludes that same testimony.6 
This comment will discuss the evolution of the Daubert Standard and the issues courts 
and litigants face in light of the expert admissibility standards using the talc litigation as a case 
study.  Part II gives a brief history of the different standards adopted by federal and states courts 
through common law and the legislature. It further discusses some of the most substantial 
critiques of the Daubert Standard since the Supreme Court’s holding more than two decades ago.  
Part III explores the talc litigation and gives a broad overview of its claims, nature, size, and 
presence in the media.  Part IV presents a case study which looks at several experts whose 
testimony has been excluded in some courts while allowed in other courts based on the expert 
standard applied, whether Daubert or other admissibility criteria.  Part V will discuss the 
shortcomings of the Daubert Standard as demonstrated through the case studies and review 
proffered solutions to the issue. In addition, this section acknowledges the issue of courts 
 
4 Id.  
5 See e.g., Carl v. Johnson & Johnson, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2102 (calling Dr. Colditz and Dr. Cramer as 
expert witnesses); Ristesund v. Johnson & Johnson, 22nd Judicial Circuit of Missouri, Case No. 1422-CC09012-01 
(calling Dr. Colditz as an expert witness); Blaes v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 4:14CV213 RLW, 2016 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 6399 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 20, 2016) (calling Dr. Colditz as an expert witness); Berg v. Johnson & Johnson, 940 F. 
Supp. 2d 983 (D.S.D. 2013) (calling Dr. Cramer as an expert witness). 
6 Carrie Salls & John O’Brien, In One State, Testimony 'Made For Litigation'; In Another, Part Of $127M In 
Verdicts, Forbes (Sept 21, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalnewsline/2016/09/21/in-one-state-testimony-
made-for-litigation-in-another-part-of-127m-in-verdicts/#3d29425c8b50. 
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applying different expert admissibility standards outside of Daubert, such as Frye, and reaching 
different conclusions about the same expert testimony.  
II. EVOLUTION OF THE EXPERT STANDARD 
For seventy years, until the Supreme Court’s holding in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, the traditional standard for assessing expert admissibility was historically 
known as the Frye Standard, which originated in a 1923 District of Columbia Circuit case.7  The 
Frye Standard was then largely used by state and federal courts until the Supreme Court 
developed the Daubert Standard in 1993.8  The Daubert Standard was later clarified in 1997 and 
1999 with regards to the appellate standard of review and the Standard’s application to 
nonscientific expert testimony.9  In 2000, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 was updated in response 
to Daubert.10  
A. The Expert Testimony Standard Developed from Frye v. United States Was 
an Attempt at Creating a Way to Assess Expert Credibility. 
 
Under the Frye Standard expert testimony is necessary when the answer to a question lies 
outside the scope of a lay person’s knowledge.11  Unlike the modern standard, the Frye Standard 
did not set forth factors to weigh or analyze when determining the admissibility of expert 
testimony, rather it relied solely on whether or not an expert’s opinion was generally accepted as 
reliable in the scientific community.12  Although handed down in 1923, the Frye Standard was 
not actively used by the courts until the 1970s.13  The Frye Standard was originally only used in 
 
7 Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Frye, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
8 Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
9 GE v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 139 (1997); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150-51 (1999) 
10 FED. R. EVID. 702 Advisory Committee Notes. 
11 Frye, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
12 Id. 
13 Anjelica Cappellino, Daubert vs. Frye: Navigating the Standards of Admissibility for Expert Testimony, THE 
EXPERT INSTITUTE (July 17, 2018), https://www.theexpertinstitute.com/daubert-vs-frye-navigating-the-standards-of-
admissibility-for-expert-testimony/  
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criminal trials, however it was later applied to most civil cases as well. 14 When evaluating expert 
testimony in toxic tort litigation, many different standards were applied.15  While some courts 
applied Frye to the litigations, other courts used a stricter interpretation of the original Federal 
Rule of Evidence 702, while some even adopted a “let-it-all-in” philosophy.16  As a result of the 
different interpretations and applications, the Frye Standard was often criticized as too vague, 
which eventually led to the development of the modern standard in Daubert in 1993.17 
B. The Supreme Court Addressed the Concern Surrounding Expert Testimony 
and Developed the Daubert Standard. 
 
The Daubert Standard was handed down from the United States Supreme Court in 
1993.18  The case revolved around birth defects allegedly caused by drugs manufactured by the 
defendant and ingested by the mothers during pregnancy.19  One of the plaintiffs experts in 
Daubert intended to testify to the alleged drug-caused birth defects, but his testimony was 
excluded by the district court.20  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision citing the 
Frye Standard, which accepted testimony only if it was sufficiently established that the methods 
and findings were generally accepted.21  The Ninth Circuit found the expert’s testimony was not 
generally accepted in the scientific community and thus was inadmissible. 22  On appeal, the 
Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s judgment finding the excluded evidence should have 
 
14 Id.  
15 David E. Bernstein, The Misbegotten Judicial Resistance to the Daubert Revolution, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 27, 
35-40 (2013). 
16 David E. Bernstein & Eric G. Lasker, Defending Daubert: It’s Time to Amend Federal Rule Of Evidence 702, 57 
WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 1, 4 (2015); David E. Bernstein, The Misbegotten Judicial Resistance to the Daubert 
Revolution, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 27, 40 (2013). 
17 David E. Bernstein & Eric G. Lasker, Defending Daubert: It’s Time to Amend Federal Rule Of Evidence 702, 57 
William & Mary L. Rev. 1, 4 (2015); David E. Bernstein, The Misbegotten Judicial Resistance to the Daubert 
Revolution, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 27, 40 (2013). 
18 Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 583-84. 
21 Id. at 584. 
22 Id. at 584. 
 5 
been admissible.23  In its decision, the Supreme Court relied on five factors, instead of the 
generally accepted standard from Frye. 24  The factors include whether there is: (1) a valid and 
repeatable scientific experiment; (2) a peer reviewed or published study, (3) a standard which 
controls the theory; (4) a known or potential rate of error; and (5) a widespread acceptance of the 
findings in the scientific community.25  The five factors may be considered and weighed against 
one another, but they need not all be addressed if the situation does not warrant an element.26 
Because the factors are weighed under Daubert instead of solely relying on general acceptance in 
the scientific community, the Daubert Standard evaluates expert testimony more broadly and in 
theory allows in more expert testimony so long as other factors are sufficiently met. 
Under the Daubert Standard, judges serve as gatekeepers in reviewing an expert’s 
intended testimony, prior to allowing it at trial, to sort out “junk science.”27  The gatekeeper role 
stems from the idea a jury full of lay people may not be able to discern what complex scientific 
testimony is credible and what is not.28  In its opinion the Supreme Court noted the Daubert 
Standard was meant to give more power to juries and that rigorous cross-examination of experts 
was a better alternative than excluding their testimony altogether.29  However, the gatekeeping 
role in turn has created the assumption that judges are better suited to sort through complex 
scientific issues.30  While the Supreme Court in its opinion intended the Daubert Standard to 
give more power to juries, its emphasis on the gatekeeping role has been at the forefront of the 
 
23 Daubert, 509 U.S. 579, 598 (1993). 
24 Id. at 594. 
25 Id.  
26 Id.  
27 Id. at 596-97; FED. R. EVID. 702 Advisory Committee Notes. 
28 What Daubert Means For Product Liability Cases In Missouri, Law360 (Jan. 22, 2018), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1004000/what-daubert-means-for-product-liability-cases-in-missouri.  
29 Daubert, 509 U.S. 579, 596-97 (1993). 
30 See e.g., Jay P. Kesan, Note, An Autopsy of Scientific Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 84 GEO. L.J. 1985, 1988 
(1996). 
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Standard’s application instead.  Although the Supreme Court indicated the Daubert Standard and 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 were meant to invoke a flexible inquiry into expert testimony, 
some courts have taken a different interpretation in finding Daubert is more strict and imposes a 
higher level of scrutiny than Frye.31  As a result of this rift, courts’ application of the Daubert 
Standard is vulnerable to a lack of uniformity, which can result in the same expert’s testimony 
being admitted in one court and excluded in another.   
C. Other Cases Which Clarify the Daubert Standard 
 
Although the Daubert Standard was created by the Supreme Court to clarify the previous 
expert admissibility standard, their opinion created new questions including what the standard of 
review on appeal is and how Daubert applies to nonscientific expert testimony.  In Kumho Tire 
Co. v. Carmichael, the Supreme Court held the Daubert Standard should not be restricted to only 
evaluating scientific experts and should be used in determining the admissibility of any expert’s 
testimony.32  The Supreme Court also ruled in General Electric Co. v. Joiner that Daubert 
applies not only to the expert’s methodology, but to their reasoning as well.33 
It is important to note the standard of review on appeal regarding issues of expert 
admissibility.  The issue was first addressed in general terms of evidentiary rulings.34  The trial 
judge must determine that expert testimony, findings, and opinions are not only relevant, but also 
 
31 Daubert, 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993); Hall v. Baxter, No. 92-182, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18960, 39 (D. Or. Dec.18, 
1996). 
32 The decision in Kumho Tire was a result of a circuit split where some courts only applied Daubert to scientific 
experts as specified in the previous version of Rule 702 while other courts applied Daubert to nonscientific experts 
as well like economists and psychologists. Anjelica Cappellino, Daubert vs. Frye: Navigating the Standards of 
Admissibility for Expert Testimony, THE EXPERT INSTITUTE (July 17, 2018), 
https://www.theexpertinstitute.com/daubert-vs-frye-navigating-the-standards-of-admissibility-for-expert-testimony/.   
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court finding the trial judge incorrectly applied the Daubert Standard to a 
nonscientific expert in tire failure. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999).  The Supreme Court then reversed the 
circuit court’s decision holding the Daubert Standard applied to both scientific testimony as well as technical or 
other specialized testimony from non-scientists. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. 137, 150-51 (1999). Id. 
33 GE, 522 U.S. 136, 143 (1997). 
34 GE, 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
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reliable.35  The Eleventh Circuit in General Electric applied a standard of review greater than 
abuse of discretion because they believed under the Daubert Standard the evidence was 
admissible.36  The Supreme Court clarified Daubert did not change or address the abuse of 
discretion standard that must be applied when assessing evidentiary rulings on appeal.37  The 
appellate court may only overturn a decision under Daubert if there is abuse of discretion or 
plain error.38  In other words, trial judges have broad discretion under Daubert in deciding what 
expert testimony is admissible and what testimony is excludable.39  Since the accepted standard 
of review is abuse of discretion, appellate judges may not categorically distinguish between 
lower court rulings that allow expert testimony and those which exclude it.40  Therefore, the 
appellate court must review exclusions and admissions of expert testimony in the same manner, 
with the same abuse of discretion standard.41  In some cases this means two different judges can 
look at the same expert witness, testimony, and opinions and come to different conclusions and 
the different decisions will likely not be overturned on appeal due to the abuse of discretion 
standard.  
D. Most States Follow the Daubert Standard, While Others Remain on the Frye 
Standard or Their Own Unique Method of Assessing Credibility.  
 
While federal courts are required to apply the Daubert Standard under the doctrine of 
stare decisis, state courts are not similarly bound.42  The state courts in Nevada, North Dakota, 
 
35 Id.   
36 Joiner v. GE, 78 F.3d 524 (11th Cir. 1996). 
37 GE, 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
38 Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
39 Id.  
40 GE, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997). 
41 Id.  
42 Stare Decisis, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining stare decisis as the doctrine of precedent where a 
court must follow earlier judicial decisions); David L. Shapiro, State Courts and Federal Declaratory Judgments, 74 
NW. U. L. REV. 759, 771 (1979) (reiterating state courts are not bound by lower federal courts because “[lower] 
federal courts are no more than coordinate with the state courts on issues of federal law”).  
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and Virginia use their own standard for assessing the admissibility of expert testimony.43  The 
state courts in California, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington 
use the Frye Standard, or something very similar.44  Florida state courts at one time applied the 
Daubert Standard, but recently returned back to the Frye Standard following a State Supreme 
Court decision in an attempt to reduce the confusion created by the Daubert Standard.45  All 
other unlisted state courts have adopted the Daubert Standard in some fashion.46  States have 
adopted the Daubert Standard in different ways.  For example, New Jersey adopted the Standard 
through a landmark decision in the Accutane Litigation in 2018.47  On the other hand, the 
Missouri State Legislature adopted the Daubert Standard by revising their state statute governing 
expert admissibility to mirror Daubert in 2017.48 
1. New Jersey Adopted the Daubert Standard in a Landmark State 
Supreme Court Decision in 2018. 
 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey recently adopted a standard similar to Daubert in the 
Accutane Litigation in 2018.49  The state stopped short of saying they adopted the full Daubert 
Standard, but the factors are now incorporated into how New Jersey courts are to assess expert 
 
43 Michael Morgenstern, Daubert v. Frye – A State-by-State Comparison, THE EXPERT INSTITUTE (April 3, 2017), 
https://www.theexpertinstitute.com/daubert-v-frye-a-state-by-state-comparison/. 
44 Id.  
45 DeLisle v. Crane Co., 258 So. 3d 1219 (Fla. 2018); Sean McDonough & Jacqueline Bertelsen, Frye Is Now, and 
Once Again, the Standard for Expert Opinion Admissibility in Florida, WILSONELSER (Oct, 25, 2018), 
https://www.productliabilityadvocate.com/2018/10/frye-is-now-and-once-again-the-standard-for-expert-opinion-
admissibility-in-florida/. 
46 Michael Morgenstern, Daubert v. Frye – A State-by-State Comparison, THE EXPERT INSTITUTE (April 3, 2017), 
https://www.theexpertinstitute.com/daubert-v-frye-a-state-by-state-comparison/. 
47 In re Accutane Litig., 234 N.J. 340 (2018) (adopting an expert admissibility standard that is effectively thought of 
as the Daubert Standard.). 
48 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 490.065 (removing “reasonably relied upon” criteria of the old statute replacing it with a 
heightened requirement where the court must find a series of factors mirroring the Daubert Standard).  
49 Tara L. Pehush, David A. Fusco & Jake Morrison, Taking Out the “Junk”: New Jersey Supreme Court Adopts 




admissibility.50  However, the state supreme court emphasized the importance of the gatekeeping 
role judges play in civil cases.51  Prior to adopting the Daubert Standard, New Jersey courts 
followed a standard set forth in Kemp v. State.52  The Kemp Standard and the Daubert Standard 
both had the same goal of keeping out “junk science,” but they differed on whether the judge or 
the jurors should decide the credibility of an expert’s testimony.53  In the Accutane Litigation, 
the trial court excluded plaintiffs’ experts’ testimony, but the Appellate Division reversed the 
decision finding the more liberal Kemp Standard made the testimony admissible.54  On appeal, 
the Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the Appellate Division and affirmed the trial court all 
while adopting the new judge-driven standard.55  New Jersey demonstrated one way courts have 
adopted the Daubert Standard through common law and the doctrine of stare decisis.  
2. Missouri Adopted the Daubert Standard Through Legislation Signed 
into Law and Enacted in 2017. 
 
Missouri, like New Jersey, also adopted the Daubert Standard in 2017.56  Unlike New 
Jersey, Missouri’s change in standard did not result from a state supreme court decision, instead 
 
50 Timothy I. Duffy, Mark K. Silver, Joseph C. Amoroso, Joseph P. Fiteni, & Maryam M. Meseha, New Jersey 
Supreme Court Embraces Use Of Daubert Factors To Determine Admissibility Of Expert Opinion, COUGHLIN 
DUFFY (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.coughlinduffy.com/news-events/new-jersey-supreme-court-embraces-use-of-
daubert-factors-to-determine-admissibility-of-expert-opinion; Tara L. Pehush, David A. Fusco & Jake Morrison, 
Taking Out the “Junk”: New Jersey Supreme Court Adopts Daubert “Factors” in Landmark Decision on Scientific 
Evidence, NAT. L. REV. (Feb,. 21, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/taking-out-junk-new-jersey-
supreme-court-adopts-daubert-factors-landmark-decision. 
51 In re Accutane Litig., 234 N.J. 340, 347-48 (2018). 
52 Kemp v. State, 174 N.J. 412, 427 (2002).  
53 Bill Wichert, Roche May Test Liberal NJ Expert Standard In Accutane Battle, LAW360 (Aug. 2, 2017), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/950548/roche-may-test-liberal-nj-expert-standard-in-accutane-battle. 
54 In re Accutane Litig., 165 A.3d 832 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017); In re Accutane Litig., 234 N.J. 340, 347-48 
(2018). 
55 Bill Wichert, Roche May Test Liberal NJ Expert Standard In Accutane Battle, LAW360 (Aug. 2, 2017), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/950548/roche-may-test-liberal-nj-expert-standard-in-accutane-battle. 
56 Nicole C. Behnen, Aaron Chickos & Luke J. Mangan, Missouri Adopts Daubert Standard Governing 




the state passed legislation to update its existing expert admissibility statute.57  The revised 
statute, Missouri Revised Statute § 490.065, lays out the Daubert Factors and reaffirms the 
judge’s gatekeeping role.58  Prior to the revision, the relevant portion of the statute regarding 
expert admissibility read: 
The facts or data in a particular case upon which an expert bases an 
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to 
him at or before the hearing and must be of a type reasonably relied 
upon by experts in the field in forming opinions or inferences upon 
the subject and must be otherwise reasonably reliable.59   
 
Missouri’s updated expert admissibility statute removed the “reasonably relied upon” 
criteria and in its place are Daubert Factors.60  The current version of the Missouri statute reads:  
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the 
expert has been made aware of or personally observed.  If experts in 
the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or 
data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need not be 
admissible for the opinion to be admitted. But if the facts or data 
would otherwise be inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion may 
disclose them to the jury only if their probative value in helping the 
jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial 
effect.61   
 
The Missouri legislature had tried to adopt the Daubert Standard in 2016, however the 
legislation was vetoed by then Governor Jay Nixon in 2016.62  Missouri courts had previously 
 
57 Nicole C. Behnen, Aaron Chickos & Luke J. Mangan, Missouri Adopts Daubert Standard Governing 
Admissibility of Expert Opinion Evidence, NAT. L. REV. (Mar. 29, 2017), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/missouri-adopts-daubert-standard-governing-admissibility-expert-opinion-
evidence. 
58 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 490.065. 
59 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 490.065 (LexisNexis, Lexis Advance through 100th General Assembly, Legislation effective 
through August 28, 2019, and the first extra session). 
60 Nicole C. Behnen, Aaron Chickos & Luke J. Mangan, Missouri Adopts Daubert Standard Governing 
Admissibility of Expert Opinion Evidence, NAT. L. REV. (Mar. 29, 2017), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/missouri-adopts-daubert-standard-governing-admissibility-expert-opinion-
evidence. 
61 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 490.065. 
62 Nicole C. Behnen, Aaron Chickos & Luke J. Mangan, Missouri Adopts Daubert Standard Governing 




been known as a plaintiff-friendly system.63  One of the goals behind the new expert 
admissibility legislation was to reduce the “Judicial Hellhole” environment in Missouri, as noted 
by the American Tort Reform Foundation.64  Critics of the Daubert Standard are worried the 
standard will require judges to decide complex scientific issues outside their area of expertise.65  
This issue will be further explored using the talc litigation as a case study. 
E. Federal Rule of Evidence 702, Confusion Following the Amendment, and 
Courts Creating Their Own Standard. 
 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 was amended seven years after Daubert was decided and 
outlines when an expert may testify.66  The purpose of the amendment was to codify a more 
rigorous approach to evaluating expert testimony.67  The current version of Rule 702 reads:  
“A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an 
opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the 
testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is 
the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert 
has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the 
case.”68  
 
In Daubert, the Supreme Court noted Rule 702 “requires a valid scientific connection to 
the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility.”69  But at the time the Daubert decision 
was handed down, Rule 702 was different than it is today.  Rule 702, at the time Daubert was 
 
63 Maggie Hummel, Missouri’s New Expert Witness Statute, SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY L. J., 
https://www.slu.edu/law/law-journal/online/2017-18/missouri-new-expert-witness-statute.php (Nov. 2, 2019). 
64 American Tort Reform Foundation, Judicial Hellholes 2016-2017, http://www.judicialhellholes.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/12/JudicialHellholes-2016.pdf. 
65 Maggie Hummel, Missouri’s New Expert Witness Statute, SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY L. J., 
https://www.slu.edu/law/law-journal/online/2017-18/missouri-new-expert-witness-statute.php (Nov. 2, 2019). 
66 Report Of The Advisory Committee On Evidence Rules To The Standing Committee On Rules Of Practice And 
Procedure, 5-7 (May 1, 1999). 
67 Id. at 7. 
68 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
69 Daubert, 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993). 
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handed down, read “If scientific, technical, or otherwise specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of 
an opinion or otherwise.”70  As such, courts will occasionally use the old version of Rule 702 
rather than the post-2000 amended rule.71  In fact, some courts have disregarded the language of 
Rule 702 altogether in favor of their own interpretation of the Daubert Standard.72 
For example, in litigation alleging contaminated baby formula, the district court excluded 
plaintiff’s expert’s testimony.73  On appeal the Eighth Circuit adopted their own interpretation of 
Rule 702 by boiling it down to a three-part test:  
First, evidence based on scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge must be useful to the finder of fact in deciding the 
ultimate issue of fact.  This is the basic rule of relevancy. Second, 
the proposed witness must be qualified to assist the finder of fact. 
Third, the proposed evidence must be reliable or trustworthy in an 
evidentiary sense, so that, if the finder of fact accepts it as true, it 
provides the assistance the finder of fact requires.74   
 
This three-part test came from several cases which can be traced back to an evidence 
treatise authored by Margaret Berger.75  Berger was a leading critic for stricter rules for expert 
admissibility, especially in toxic tort litigation.76  
 
70 Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1937 (1975) (establishing the Federal Rules of Evidence). 
71 David E. Bernstein & Eric G. Lasker, Defending Daubert: It’s Time to Amend Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 57 
William & Mary L. Rev. 1, 24 (2015). 
72 Id. at 19-24. 
73 Johnson v. Mead Johnson & Co., LLC, 754 F.3d 557 (8th Cir. 2014). 
74 Id. at 561; Lauzon v. Senco Prods., Inc., 270 F.3d 681, 686 (8th Cir. 2001). 
75 Johnson v. Mead Johnson & Co., LLC, 754 F.3d 557, 561 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing Polski v. Quigley Corp., 538 
F.3d 836, 839 (8th Cir. 2008)) (citing Lauzon v. Senco Products, Inc., . 270 F.3d 681, 686 (8th Cir. 2001)) (citing 
Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 702App.01 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 
Matthew Bender & Co. 2d ed. 2015)). 
76 Margaret A. Berger, What Has a Decade of Daubert Wrought?, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH (SUPPLEMENT I) S59, 
S59-61 (2005). 
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The Ninth Circuit also adopted its own interpretation of Rule 702.77 It completely ignores 
Rule 702(d) which reads, “the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts 
of the case.” 78  In place of Rule 702(d) the Ninth Circuit held the judge as a gatekeeper must 
determine the reliability of the methodology, but leave the question of whether the expert 
reliably applied the methodology to the jury.79 
The amended version of Rule 702 affirmed the idea the judge is a gatekeeper, but also 
required the judge take a more managerial role regarding expert admissibility.80  The various 
interpretations courts are taking with regards to Rule 702 have created an atmosphere where 
expert admissibility standards are applied without uniformity.  The lack of uniformity can result 
in an expert’s testimony being accepted by one court, while the same expert’s testimony may be 
rejected by another court.  
III. TALCUM POWDER LITIGATION 
 
The talcum powder litigation, specifically regarding ovarian cancer, is based around talc 
products such as Johnson & Johnson Baby Powder and Shower to Shower.81  The plaintiffs 
allege all claims are a “direct and proximate result of Defendants’ and/or their corporate 
predecessors negligent, willful, and wrongful conduct in connection with the design, 
development, manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, distribution, labeling, 
and/or sale of the products.”82  The named Defendants usually include Johnson & Johnson, 
Johnson & Johnson Consumer Companies, Inc., Imerys Talc America, Inc., and Personal Care 
 
77 City of Pomona v. SQM N. Am. Corp., 750 F.3d 1036, 1047 (9th Cir. 2014) 
78 Id.; Fed. R. Evid. 702(d).  
79 City of Pomona v. SQM N. Am. Corp., 750 F.3d 1036, 1047 (9th Cir. 2014). 
80 See e.g. David L. Faigman, The Daubert Revolution and the Birth of Modernity: Managing 
Scientific Evidence in the Age of Science, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 893, 907 (2013). 
81 Complaint, Hogans v. Johnson & Johnson, Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, (MO June 23, 2014),  
https://www.beasleyallen.com/media/2016/02/Fox-complaint.pdf 
82 Complaint at 8, Hogans v. Johnson & Johnson, Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, (MO June 23, 2014),  
https://www.beasleyallen.com/media/2016/02/Fox-complaint.pdf 
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Products Council.83  In the short form complaints filed by Plaintiffs in the Multidistrict litigation 
in New Jersey, there are up to twenty-three claims against the Defendants including failure to 
warn, manufacturers and design defects, breach of express warranty, and breach of implied 
warranty among others.84  Imerys Talc America filed for Chapter 11 protection in February 2019 
in light of the widespread litigation.85  The Defendants maintain that the talc and talc products do 
not include asbestos and are not inherently dangerous.86  Because the Plaintiffs and Defendants 
allege opposite scientific findings, they both have experts to support their claims.  The experts all 
employ various scientific tests and statistical analyses to support their conclusions and are thus 
evaluated for credibility and reliable methodology during Daubert Hearings.  The dispute is 
rooted in plaintiffs’ experts asserting talc causes inflammation, which in turn causes ovarian 
cancer, and the presence of asbestos in talc; Defense experts maintain the exact opposite.  Each 
expert usually develops a report based on their research, potential experiments, and conclusions 
in order to satisfy the Daubert Standard, or the expert admissibility standard used in the forum.87 
The opposing opinions, supported by science and statistical analyses, make Daubert Hearings 
even more complex. 
A. Johnson & Johnson’s Talc Cases and Where They Are Being Filed 
 
 
83 Complaint at 7, Hogans v. Johnson & Johnson, Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, (MO June 23, 2014),  
https://www.beasleyallen.com/media/2016/02/Fox-complaint.pdf 
84 Complaint at 5-6, Hogans v. Johnson & Johnson, 3:18-cv-5271 (Apr. 3, 2018). 
85 Tina Bellon & Tom Hals, Johnson & Johnson supplier seeks bankruptcy over talc lawsuits, REUTERS (Feb. 13, 
2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-imerys-bankruptcy/johnson-johnson-supplier-seeks-bankruptcy-over-talc-
lawsuits-idUSKCN1Q22H7. 
86 Tina Bellon & Tom Hals, Johnson & Johnson supplier seeks bankruptcy over talc lawsuits, REUTERS (Feb. 13, 
2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-imerys-bankruptcy/johnson-johnson-supplier-seeks-bankruptcy-over-talc-
lawsuits-idUSKCN1Q22H7. 
87 Johnson & Johnson, About Daubert: Information on Federal Rules of Evidence, FactsAboutTalc, 
https://www.factsabouttalc.com/_document/about-daubert-information-on-federal-rules-of-evidence?id=0000016d-
b710-d9c2-a17f-b7b199020000 (Nov. 3, 2019) 
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Johnson & Johnson is one of many companies facing lawsuits as a result of its talcum 
powder products.  The first high profile talc litigation involving Johnson & Johnson was an 
ovarian cancer suit in 2013.88  According to Johnson & Johnson’s second report released in June 
2019, there are 15,500 cases pending in talc litigation.89  To put the growth of the litigation into 
perspective, Johnson & Johnson’s first quarter report in 2016 – just three years prior – included 
1,400 cases pending in the talc litigation.90  As of May 2014 there were two class action suits 
pending against the company in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
California and United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois.91  As of 2019, the 
cases filed in federal court have been organized into a multidistrict litigation in the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey.92  Cases not filed in federal court are primarily 
being filed in Missouri, New Jersey, and California in addition to those filed outside the United 
States.93 
B. The Talc Litigation’s Appearance in the Media. 
 
The media has consistently reported on the massive litigation, with multiple articles being 
released every day.94  The first highly publicized jury trial took place in early 2016 in St. Louis 
 
88 Johnson & Johnson, Facts About Talc, FactsAboutTalc, https://www.factsabouttalc.com/litigation (Nov. 3, 2019). 
89 Johnson & Johnson, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) at 31 (June 30, 2019), https://johnsonandjohnson.gcs-
web.com/static-files/3c846c82-8c94-405c-a707-c32100438f42  
90 Johnson & Johnson, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) at 19 (Apr. 3, 2016), https://johnsonandjohnson.gcs-
web.com/node/39761/html. 
91 Id.  
92 Johnson & Johnson, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) at 32 (June 30, 2019), https://johnsonandjohnson.gcs-
web.com/static-files/3c846c82-8c94-405c-a707-c32100438f42 
93 Id.  
94 See e.g., Chad Terhune & Lisa Girion, Exclusive: J&J's own expert, working for FDA, found asbestos in Baby 
Powder, REUTERS (Oct. 30, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-health-j-j-expert-exclusive/exclusive-jjs-
own-expert-working-for-fda-found-asbestos-in-baby-powder-idUSKBN1X912O; Peter Loftus, J&J Says Suspect 
Baby Powder Is Asbestos-Free, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/j-j-says-
suspect-baby-powder-is-asbestos-free-11572386665; Tiffany Hsu, Johnson & Johnson Says Recalled Baby Powder 
Doesn’t Have Asbestos, NY TIMES (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/29/business/johnson-baby-
powder-asbestos.html. 
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Missouri where a woman was awarded $72 million in damages.95  A Los Angeles court ordered 
Johnson & Johnson pay $417 million in damages in August 2017.96  In July 2018, a Missouri 
state court awarded a group of twenty-two women $4.14 billion in punitive damages in addition 
to the $550 million award for their ovarian cancer claims.97  In May 2019, a New York state 
court ordered Johnson & Johnson to pay $300 million in punitive damages to a single 
mesothelioma plaintiff on top of the $20 million for pain and suffering.98  
C. The Talc Litigation Requires Judges to Assess Many Different Types of 
Scientific and Non-Scientific Experts Along with Their Complex Analyses. 
 
As a result of the highly technical and scientific nature of the claims against the defendants, 
both the Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee, a group of plaintiffs and their attorneys, who led the 
litigation, and the defendants have hired many experts.  For example, in the District of New 
Jersey the talc multidistrict litigation had experts in fields such as cancer biology, gynecologic 
oncology, toxicology, epidemiology, and asbestos in talc.99  In total, the Plaintiffs’ Steering 
Committee had twenty-two experts and defendant Johnson & Johnson had seventeen experts.100  
 
95 Reuters, The $72 Million Talc Verdict Against J&J May Not Set a Precedent, FORTUNE (Feb. 26, 2016), 
https://fortune.com/2016/02/26/jnj-verdict-talc/. 
96 Jef Feeley & Margaret Cronin Fisk, J&J's Risk From Tainted-Talc Lawsuits Only Gets Bigger in 2019, 
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-21/j-j-s-tainted-talc-risk-expands-
as-cancer-trials-triple-in-2019. 
97 Jonathan D. Rockoff & Sara Randazzo, J&J Hit With $4.7 Billion Jury Verdict in Baby Powder Suit, WALL 
STREET JOURNAL (July 12, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/j-j-hit-with-550-million-jury-verdict-in-baby-
powder-suit-1531435569?mod=article_inline. 
98 Peter Loftus, Johnson & Johnson Hit With $300 Million in Punitive Damages in Talc Case, WALL STREET 
JOURNAL (May 31, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/johnson-johnson-hit-with-300-million-in-punitive-
damages-in-talc-case-11559339141. 
99 Nicholas Malfitano, Eight-Day Hearing On Viability Of Witnesses In Talc Lawsuits Set To Conclude, PENN. 
RECORD (Jul. 31, 2019), https://pennrecord.com/stories/512811144-eight-day-hearing-on-viability-of-witnesses-in-
talc-lawsuits-set-to-conclude 




Despite the large number of experts on both sides, the Daubert Hearings in the District of New 
Jersey were ultimately restricted to five Plaintiff experts and three Johnson & Johnson experts.101   
A topic of constant discussion with the experts in the talcum powder litigation is the 
Bradford Hill Analysis.102  The Bradford Hill Criteria, authored by Sir Austin Bradford Hill, 
consists of nine viewpoints to help ascertain if associations are causal.103  The Criteria assess the 
strength of association, consistency, specificity, temporality, biological gradient, plausibility, 
coherence, experiment, and analogy of the observed experiment.104  The Bradford Hill Criteria 
are just one way for an expert, and perhaps a court in Daubert hearings to assess the findings and 
opinions regarding association and causation.  Causation is the key issue in the talc litigation.  
Plaintiffs’ experts have alleged there is asbestos, a known carcinogen, in the talc which causes 
ovarian cancer.105  Plaintiffs’ experts also contend talc, on its own, causes ovarian cancer 
regardless of if asbestos is present in the mineral powder due to the nonasbestiform mineral 
fibers.106  Meanwhile, Defendants’ experts claim there is no association between talcum powder 
and the development of ovarian cancer. 107  In addition, Defendants’ experts maintain there is no 
 
101 Nicholas Malfitano, Eight-Day Hearing On Viability Of Witnesses In Talc Lawsuits Set To Conclude, PENN. 
RECORD (Jul. 31, 2019), https://pennrecord.com/stories/512811144-eight-day-hearing-on-viability-of-witnesses-in-
talc-lawsuits-set-to-conclude. 
102 David Schwartz & Nathan Schachtman, Presenting The Science Is Key In Talc Trials, Law360 (June 9, 2017), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/932683/presenting-the-science-is-key-in-talc-trials. 
103 Kristen M. Fedak, Autumn Bernal, Zachary A. Capshaw, & Sherilyn Gross, Applying the Bradford Hill criteria 
in the 21st century: how data integration has changed causal inference in molecular epidemiology, EMERGING 
THEMES IN EPIDEMIOLOGY (Sep. 30, 2015), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4589117/. 
104 Kristen M. Fedak, Autumn Bernal, Zachary A. Capshaw, & Sherilyn Gross, Applying the Bradford Hill criteria 
in the 21st century: how data integration has changed causal inference in molecular epidemiology, EMERGING 
THEMES IN EPIDEMIOLOGY (Sep. 30, 2015), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4589117/. 
105 Complaint at 49, Hogans, et. al. v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 1422-CC09012 (June 23, 2014), 
https://www.beasleyallen.com/media/2016/02/Fox-complaint.pdf. 
106 Complaint at 49, Hogans, et. al. v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 1422-CC09012 (June 23, 2014), 
https://www.beasleyallen.com/media/2016/02/Fox-complaint.pdf. 
107 Hillary Brueck, Johnson & Johnson is being investigated by the SEC over fears its baby powder may cause 
cancer — here's how worried you should be, BUSINESS INSIDER (Feb. 21, 2019), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/does-baby-powder-cause-cancer-johnson-and-johnson-lawsuit-2018-7; Peter 
Loftus, J&J Says Suspect Baby Powder Is Asbestos-Free, WSJ (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/j-j-
says-suspect-baby-powder-is-asbestos-free-11572386665. 
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asbestos in the tested talc products.108  The Bradford Hill Criteria, largely used in the field of 
epidemiology, are just one example of the highly technical landscape judges encounter in 
Daubert Hearings. 
D. The Talc Litigation Demonstrates the Difficulty Courts Have in 
Differentiating Between the Daubert Standard and the Frye Standard. 
 
The adoption of the Daubert Standard is not mandatory for state courts; while all federal 
courts follow the Daubert Standard, some state courts still follow the Frye Standard or their own 
expert admissibility standard.109  The difference between the Daubert Standard and the Frye 
Standard was demonstrated recently in the talc litigation.  New York State still uses the Frye 
Standard whereas the federal courts, like the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia, follow the Daubert Standard. 110  One expert who has testified in the talc litigation in 
multiple courts is Dr. Ronald Gordon.  Dr. Gordon, a pathologist and microscopist, has testified 
in federal and state courts on asbestos and talc related matters.111  
On August 5, 2019 Judge Hogan of the District Court for the District of Columbia, using 
the Daubert Standard, excluded expert Dr. Gordon’s testimony. 112  Judge Hogan cited Dr. 
Gordon’s faulty research method, which failed to account for false positives, as the reasoning 
behind the exclusion.113  A Georgia state court, also following the Daubert Standard, excluded 
Dr. Gordon’s testimony as well once again citing his unorthodox methodology and issues with 
 
108 Hillary Brueck, Johnson & Johnson is being investigated by the SEC over fears its baby powder may cause 
cancer — here's how worried you should be, BUSINESS INSIDER (Feb. 21, 2019), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/does-baby-powder-cause-cancer-johnson-and-johnson-lawsuit-2018-7; Peter 
Loftus, J&J Says Suspect Baby Powder Is Asbestos-Free, WSJ (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/j-j-
says-suspect-baby-powder-is-asbestos-free-11572386665. 
109 Michael Morgenstern, Daubert v. Frye – A State-by-State Comparison, THE EXPERT INSTITUTE (April 3, 2017), 
https://www.theexpertinstitute.com/daubert-v-frye-a-state-by-state-comparison/. 
110 Sean R. v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 26 N.Y.3d 801 (2016); Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
111 34-13 Mealey's Litig. Rep. Asb. 10 (2019). 
112 Id.  
113 Id.  
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replicability.114  The judge in Georgia also alluded to issues with the expert’s creditability 
referencing criminal activity in the 1990s involving drugs and money laundering.115  
A New York State Supreme Court, on the other hand, allowed Dr. Gordon’s same expert 
testimony, despite the Judge acknowledging another court in a Frye jurisdiction had excluded his 
testimony. 116  The other Frye court, a Pennsylvania state court, excluded Dr. Gordon’s testimony 
in a Frye Hearing in 2017.117  The Pennsylvania court excluded Dr. Gordon’s testimony for the 
same reasons as the Daubert courts did: Dr. Gordon’s faulty methodology and failure to follow 
an acceptable protocol for testing.118  
The difference between the Frye Standard and Daubert Standard is difficult to discern as 
seen through the lens of Dr. Gordon testifying in the talc litigation.  At first glance it appears the 
difference between the Frye and Daubert Standards is substantial enough that one standard 
allows testimony while the other excludes the same opinions and methodologies; however, 
because two states under the Frye Standard came to different conclusions about the same 
expert’s testimony the boundaries are further blurred.  Dr. Gordon’s testimony indicates a larger 
issue with expert admissibility.  The Supreme Court in Daubert noted the new expert 
admissibility standard was supposed to be more flexible, however the exclusion of Dr. Gordon’s 
testimony under Daubert and not necessarily under Frye sends a different message. 
IV. CASE STUDIES 
 
114 Daniel Fisher, Watch New York City For Crucial Talcum Powder Verdicts In 2019, FORBES (Jan. 2, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalnewsline/2019/01/02/watch-new-york-city-for-crucial-talcum-powder-verdicts-
in-2019/#4689ce402f9e. 
115 Daniel Fisher, Watch New York City For Crucial Talcum Powder Verdicts In 2019, FORBES (Jan. 2, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalnewsline/2019/01/02/watch-new-york-city-for-crucial-talcum-powder-verdicts-
in-2019/#4689ce402f9e. 
116 Cohen v. Am. Biltrite Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 51895(U) (Sup. Ct. Aug. 27, 2018). 
117 Brandt v. Bon-Ton Stores, Inc., 2017 WL 4271039, at 5-6 (Pa. Ct. Common Pleas Sept. 25, 2017); Emma Cueto, 
Pa. Judge Bars Experts In Tainted Talc Suit Against Colgate, LAW360 (Sept. 26, 2017), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/967973/pa-judge-bars-experts-in-tainted-talc-suit-against-colgate. 




The talc litigation provides a lens through which the issues with the Daubert Standard 
and other expert admissibility standards can be seen. A great level of public scrutiny is present in 
the talc litigation because of its constant presence in the media and the sheer number of cases 
filed nationwide.  The disparity amongst courts concerning admissibility of expert testimony 
could result in disparate outcomes for plaintiffs and increase forum shopping by future claimants.  
This is exactly what happened in 2013 and 2016.119  This section will discuss the admission and 
exclusion of expert testimony by Dr. Graham Colditz, an expert in cancer epidemiology, and Dr. 
Daniel Cramer, an expert in Obstetrics & Gynecology, Ovarian Cancer, Clinical Epidemiology, 
and Reproductive Sciences.120  
A. Dr. Colditz Attempted to Testify in Both Missouri and New Jersey in the 
Talcum Powder Litigation in 2016 Before Both States Adopted the Daubert 
Standard; New Jersey Excluded His Testimony While Missouri Allowed it. 
 
Dr. Colditz is an expert in cancer epidemiology from Australia.121  Dr. Colditz served on 
numerous editorial boards for scientific journals, taught at universities including Harvard 
University and University of Queensland, and published many articles concerning cancer 
epidemiology.122  Dr. Colditz testified for plaintiffs in the talc litigation in courts including the 
New Jersey Superior Court in Atlantic County and the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis in 
 
119 Carrie Salls & John O’Brien, In One State, Testimony 'Made For Litigation'; In Another, Part Of $127M In 
Verdicts, FORBES (Sep. 21, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalnewsline/2016/09/21/in-one-state-testimony-
made-for-litigation-in-another-part-of-127m-in-verdicts/#4550d8dd8b50. 
120 Carrie Salls & John O’Brien, In One State, Testimony 'Made For Litigation'; In Another, Part Of $127M In 
Verdicts, FORBES (Sep. 21, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalnewsline/2016/09/21/in-one-state-testimony-
made-for-litigation-in-another-part-of-127m-in-verdicts/#4550d8dd8b50. 
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the State of Missouri.123  At the time New Jersey followed the Kemp Standard for expert 
admissibility while Missouri followed its own state statute for expert admissibility.124  Dr. 
Colditz testified in both Missouri and New Jersey expert admissibility hearings as to his 
epidemiological findings and opinions as they related to talc causing ovarian cancer.125  In his 
testimony, Dr. Colditz relied on the Bradford Hill Criteria.126  Dr. Colditz used the Bradford Hill 
Criteria to “prove cause and effect” calling it the “bread and butter” of epidemiologists.127  Dr. 
Colditz noted that one study on its own will not prove causality, but a whole sequence of studies 
can such as the one Dr. Cramer, another plaintiffs’ expert, created in 1982.128 
1. The New Jersey Superior Court Excluded Dr. Colditz’s Expert 
Testimony on September 2, 2016. 
 
Judge Nelson Johnson of the New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, Atlantic County 
presided over the talc litigation involving lead plaintiffs Brandi Carl and Diana Balderrama.129  
Defendants Johnson & Johnson and Imerys Talc America filed a motion to exclude Dr. Colditz’s 
expert testimony and for summary judgment in the event the testimony was excluded.130  The 
experts in the New Jersey case were evaluated under the Kemp Standard meaning Judge Johnson 
 
123 Carrie Salls & John O’Brien, In One State, Testimony 'Made For Litigation'; In Another, Part Of $127M In 
Verdicts, FORBES (Sep. 21, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalnewsline/2016/09/21/in-one-state-testimony-
made-for-litigation-in-another-part-of-127m-in-verdicts/#4550d8dd8b50. 
124 Kemp v. State, 174 N.J. 412 (2002); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 490.065 (LexisNexis, Lexis Advance through 100th 
General Assembly, Legislation effective through August 28, 2019, and the first extra session). 
125 Carl v. Johnson & Johnson, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2102, 34-37; Courtroom View Network, Clip of 
Talc Direct Examination by Allen Smith, CVN, https://pages.cvn.com/talc-litigation-iss-offer (Nov. 3, 2019). 
126 David Schwartz, Experts On The Experts: A Deep Dive Into The Make-Or-Break Scientific Testimony Deciding 
Talc Powder Trials, INNOVATIVE SCIENCE SOLUTIONS (Mar. 9, 2017), 
https://www.innovativescience.net/blog/experts-on-the-experts-a-deep-dive-into-the-make-or-break-scientific-
testimony-deciding-talc-powder-trials/. 
127 Id.; Courtroom View Network, Clip of Talc Direct Examination by Allen Smith, CVN, 
https://pages.cvn.com/talc-litigation-iss-offer (Nov. 3, 2019). 
128 Courtroom View Network, Clip of Talc Direct Examination by Allen Smith, CVN, https://pages.cvn.com/talc-
litigation-iss-offer (Nov. 3, 2019). 
129 Carl v. Johnson & Johnson, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2102. 
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was required to evaluate whether the theory of causation was acceptable under the standard.131  
The Kemp Standard was more relaxed in that “a theory of causation that had not yet reached 
general acceptance in the scientific community ‘may be found to be sufficiently reliable if it is 
based on a sound, adequately-founded scientific methodology involving data and information of 
the type reasonably relied on by experts in the scientific field.’"132  
Judge Johnson found Dr. Colditz was qualified in terms of background and education, 
however the doctor failed to show the "data or information used were soundly and reliably 
generated and were of a type reasonably relied upon by comparable experts."133  Judge Johnson 
was highly critical of the epidemiological expert and plaintiffs’ counsel stating it was as if they 
said “look at this, and forget everything else science has to teach us.”134  Judge Johnson also 
criticized the heavy reliance on the idea of inflammation and inconsistencies among plaintiffs’ 
experts findings of inflammation and their relation to causation.135  As a result of the evaluation 
of the experts under the Kemp Standard, Judge Johnson granted summary judgement in favor of 
the Defendants on September 2, 2016.136  Judge Johnson later stated the testimony had the 
hallmarks of a “made-for-litigation presentation.”137 
2. The Missouri Circuit Court Allowed Dr. Colditz’s Expert Testimony 
on April 12, 2016. 
 
 
131 Carrie Salls & John O’Brien, In One State, Testimony 'Made For Litigation'; In Another, Part Of $127M In 
Verdicts, FORBES (Sep. 21, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalnewsline/2016/09/21/in-one-state-testimony-
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134 Id. at 35. 
135 Id. at 36-37. 
136 Id.  
137 Courtroom View Network, Clip of Talc Direct Examination by Allen Smith, CVN, https://pages.cvn.com/talc-
litigation-iss-offer (Nov. 3, 2019). 
 23 
Missouri also saw a challenge to Dr. Colditz’s testimony in the talc litigation.138  
Defendant Johnson & Johnson filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. Colditz in the 
Gloria Ristesund case on March 10, 2016.139  The court denied Johnson & Johnson’s motion to 
exclude on April 12, 2016.140  The expert admissibility standard used at the time allowed an 
expert to base his opinion on facts or data “reasonably relied upon by experts in the field” when 
forming opinions.141  This flexible and minimal standard, when compared to Daubert, allowed 
many experts to testify including Dr. Colditz. 142 Dr. Colditz again relied on the Bradford Hill 
Criteria.143  In his testimony, Dr. Colditz only emphasized and relied on those elements of the 
Criteria he found “key,” which in total was three of the nine criteria.144  Just as in New Jersey, 
Dr. Colditz identified inflammation as the biological mechanism which causes ovarian cancer.145  
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs and in the final judgment entered on May 17, 
2016 the court awarded a total of $5 million in compensatory damages and $50 million in 
punitive damages.146  While the trial court found Dr. Colditz’s testimony was allowed under the 
Missouri expert admissibility standard, on appeal the appellants claimed the trial court erred in 
 
138 Defendants Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Dr Graham Colditz with Respect to Plaintiff Gloria Ristesund, 
Ristesund v. Johnson & Johnson, 22nd Judicial Circuit of Missouri, Case No. 1422-CC09012-01 (Mar. 10, 2016). 
139 Defendants Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Dr Graham Colditz with Respect to Plaintiff Gloria Ristesund, 
Ristesund v. Johnson & Johnson, 22nd Judicial Circuit of Missouri, Case No. 1422-CC09012-01 (Mar. 10, 2016). 
140 Order Denying Defendants Motion to Exclude Testimony, Ristesund v. Johnson & Johnson, 22nd Judicial Circuit 
of Missouri, Case No. 1422-CC09012-01 (Apr. 12, 2016). 
141 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 490.065 (LexisNexis, Lexis Advance through 100th General Assembly, Legislation effective 
through August 28, 2019, and the first extra session). 
142 Emily Field, J&J Talc Suits Show Evidence Standards Vary Among Courts, Law360 (Sept. 7, 2016), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/836544/j-j-talc-suits-show-evidence-standards-vary-among-courts. 
143 Courtroom View Network, Clip of Talc Direct Examination by Allen Smith, CVN, https://pages.cvn.com/talc-
litigation-iss-offer (Nov. 3, 2019). 
144 Ristesund v. Johnson & Johnson, 22nd Judicial Circuit of Missouri, Case No. 1422-CC09012-01. 
145 Carrie Salls & John O’Brien, In One State, Testimony 'Made For Litigation'; In Another, Part Of $127M In 
Verdicts, FORBES (Sep. 21, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalnewsline/2016/09/21/in-one-state-testimony-
made-for-litigation-in-another-part-of-127m-in-verdicts/#4550d8dd8b50. 




admitting the testimony.147  The case was ultimately overturned on jurisdictional grounds 
following the Supreme Court decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb Company v. Superior Court.148  
As a result of the reversal based on jurisdiction, the appellate court did not respond to appellants 
other twelve points raised on appeal, including the error in admitting Dr. Colditz’s “cherry-
picked” testimony made for litigation.149  
While the testimony of Dr. Colditz was excluded in one state and included in another, 
both decisions were well within the bounds of the expert admissibility standards used at the time.  
Different standards for expert testimony present a tremendous issue when, in a factually and 
legally identical case, litigants can have a $55 million judgement for plaintiff or a summary 
judgement for defendant depending on the standard used.  In addition to the issues presented by 
different expert admissibility standards, there is still a possibility two courts which follow the 
Daubert Standard come to different conclusions.  In fact, Dr. Colditz’s testimony, while included 
by a Missouri state court, was excluded under the Daubert Standard in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.150  The next case study will examine another expert 
that was admitted and excluded in different courts while giving the same testimony. 
B. Dr. Cramer Attempted to Testify in the United States District Court for the 
District of South Dakota and a New Jersey Superior Court, the District 
Court Admitted his Testimony Under the Daubert Standard While New 
Jersey Excluded it Under the Kemp Standard. 
 
Dr. Daniel Cramer is another expert in epidemiology from Colorado who has testified in 
the talc litigation.151  Dr. Cramer has been a professor in epidemiology as well as affiliated with 
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multiple gynecologic cancer institutions for many years.152  Dr. Cramer, like Dr. Colditz, testifies 
to the association between talc and ovarian cancer based on his understanding of inflammation-
induced cancer in addition to the cohort and case control studies available.153  Dr. Cramer has 
testified at cases across the country, including the United States District Court for the District of 
South Dakota where his testimony was admitted and the New Jersey Superior Court, Law 
Division, Atlantic County, where his testimony was excluded.154  
1. Dr. Cramer’s Testimony was Admitted in the United States District 
Court for the District of South Dakota Under the Daubert Standard 
Following a Daubert Decision on April 12, 2013. 
 
Dr. Cramer was allowed to testify in the talc litigation the United States District Court for 
the District of South Dakota following a Daubert Decision on April 12, 2013.155  The South 
Dakota District Court followed the Daubert Standard when evaluating Dr. Cramer’s 
testimony.156  Defendant’s main argument to exclude Dr. Cramer’s testimony regarded the 
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allowed them to evaluate admissibility not sufficiency of the evidence to prove causation.158  In 
admitting the testimony the court addressed Dr. Cramer’s alleged failure to rule out alternative 
causes of the cancer and Dr. Cramer’s allegedly unreliable methodology when analyzing odds 
ratios.159  Ultimately the court admitted Dr. Cramer’s testimony using a fact-sensitive analysis 
after determining that Dr. Cramer did address alternative causes and the methods regarding the 
odds ratios were reliable enough to pass the Daubert threshold although defendant’s could 
certainly attack the reliability at trial.160 
 In utilizing the Daubert Standard, the court did not address the five factors laid out by 
the Supreme Court, instead the court used the three-part test employed by the Eighth Circuit.161  
The three-part test as discussed earlier states  
First, evidence based on scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge must be useful to the finder of fact in deciding the 
ultimate issue of fact.  This is the basic rule of relevancy.  Second, 
the proposed witness must be qualified to assist the finder of fact.  
Third, the proposed evidence must be reliable or trustworthy in an 
evidentiary sense, so that, if the finder of fact accepts it as true, it 
provides the assistance the finder of fact requires. 162 
 
The three-part test is based on an evidence treatise authored by strict-standard-critic 
Margaret Berger.163  This further demonstrates the inconsistencies and issues associated with the 
Daubert Standard’s flexible application. 
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2. Dr. Cramer’s Testimony was Excluded in a New Jersey Superior 
Court Under the Kemp Standard Following a Decision on September 
2, 2016. 
 
 Judge Nelson Johnson of the New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, Atlantic County 
presided over the talc litigation involving lead plaintiffs Brandi Carl and Diana Balderrama.164  
Defendants Johnson & Johnson and Imerys Talc America filed a motion to exclude Dr. Cramer’s 
expert testimony and for summary judgement in the event the testimony was excluded just as 
they did for Dr. Colditz.165  The experts in the New Jersey case were evaluated under the Kemp 
Standard meaning Judge Johnson needed to evaluate whether the theory of causation was 
acceptable under the standard.166  The Kemp Standard was considered more relaxed than the 
Daubert Standard in that “a theory of causation that had not yet reached general acceptance in 
the scientific community ‘may be found to be sufficiently reliable if it is based on a sound, 
adequately-founded scientific methodology involving data and information of the type 
reasonably relied on by experts in the scientific field.’"167  
 Dr. Cramer’s testimony also regarded general and specific causation of ovarian cancer.168  
Dr. Cramer, like Dr. Colditz, was one of plaintiffs’ main experts and the court expressed 
disappointment with the evidence put forth claiming the witness was “dismissive of anything but 
epidemiological studies” and only used certain case-control studies.169  The court did note how 
impressive Dr. Cramer’s background is, pointing out the case-control studies the expert has 
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authored, but found his methodology problematic under the admissibility standard.170  The court 
found Dr. Cramer disregarded certain studies that did not further his opinions and incorrectly 
utilized the Bradford Hill Criteria by ignoring unfavorable results.171   
The exclusion of Dr. Cramer’s testimony in one court and the inclusion of his testimony in 
another demonstrates the quantifiable issue with the different expert admissibility standards as 
well as the different ways the courts apply the Daubert Standard.  While no damages were 
ultimately awarded in the South Dakota District Court Case, Dr. Cramer also testified in the 
Missouri state case that awarded the plaintiff $55 million in damages.172  The difference between 
a summary judgement motion, like in New Jersey, and a multimillion dollar verdict, like in other 
courts across the country, presents a puzzling issue that often stems from expert admissibility. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
There is another Talc Case pending in the District of New Jersey.173  It is a multidistrict 
litigation overseen by Judge Freda Wolfson.174  In July and August of 2019, both Plaintiffs’ 
Steering Committee and Johnson & Johnson presented experts at Daubert Hearings.175  The 
decision on the experts admissibility was not yet been released at the time this comment was 
written. The decision is expected to impact talc cases across the country but has much larger 
implications regarding the Daubert Standard.176  Only eight of the thirty-nine experts challenged 
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testified during the eight-day Daubert Hearings.177 Many of the experts have also been 
challenged, admitted, and testified in other talc cases across the country, such as Dr. William 
Longo.178  Should the District of New Jersey decision exclude frequently used – and commonly 
challenged – experts like Dr. Longo, it would further cast light on the lack of uniformity when 
applying Daubert as well as other expert admissibility standards. 
While it is beyond the scope of this comment to suggest a perfect solution for the issues 
surrounding the Daubert Standard and other expert admissibility standards, there are many 
suggestions floating around the legal profession.  Suggestions include overturning Kumho Tire, 
hosting science days in court to aid the presiding judge and having access to a science panel 
among others.179  Science days and panels however do not solve one of the main issues raised in 
this comment.  Perhaps a lack of scientific understanding contributes to the expert admissibility, 
but the standards themselves should be held accountable before the judges employing them.  
Judges must work with what they are given through precedent and expert reports.  As reflected in 
the case studies, each determination to admit or exclude an expert was well within the bounds of 
the expert admissibility standard employed.  The issue is in the flexibility of the standards and 
the vastly different standards which exist between state courts and even among the circuit courts.  
As noted, the Eighth Circuit created its own take on the Daubert Standard and as a result the 
district courts within the Eighth Circuit have followed suit.  In addition, because the Daubert 
Standard came before the amendment to Fed. R. Evid. 702, the door is still open for some courts 
 
177 Amanda Bronstad, MDL Judge Reviews Expert Evidence Over Talc's Ties to Ovarian Cancer, LAW.COM NEW 
JERSEY LAW JOURNAL (July 24, 2019), https://www.law.com/njlawjournal/2019/07/24/mdl-judge-reviews-expert-
evidence-over-talcs-ties-to-ovarian-cancer/. 
178 Daniel Fisher, Johnson & Johnson says crucial expert for talc plaintiffs lied on stand, LEGAL NEWSLINE (May 7, 
2019), https://legalnewsline.com/stories/512480634-johnson-johnson-says-crucial-expert-for-talc-plaintiffs-lied-on-
stand. 
179 Izabelle Tully, The Courtroom Turned Classroom: A Model Procedure for Educating the Gatekeepers of Expert 
Evidence in Complex Toxic Tort Cases, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 2405, 2436 (2019).  
 30 
to apply the old rule.  The Daubert Standard was a step towards clarifying the gatekeeping role 
judges play but as seen in the talc litigation, the different standards and applications still need to 
be addressed.  As evidenced by the talc litigation, a more guided approach to expert admissibility 
is necessary.  That is not to say the standard must be stricter, however setting forth more 
guidelines judges are required to follow, rather than just factors that may be considered or may 
be weighed, would plausibly aid in reducing the drastically different outcomes seen in the talc 
litigation as a result of excluding and admitting the same expert testimony in different courts.  
